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What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This study helps 
to understand this question and examine this issue on the German market. Results drawn 
from an analysis of a sample of 61 German quoted companies over the period 2005–2008 
provide support for the Germany specific characteristic of the employee representation on 
the board of directors and its positive relation with performance. The research provides 
evidence of positive impact on performance of older CEOs and Supervisory Board 
variable remuneration, on the level of operating performance measures. Shareholder 
concentration has a positive effect on the market based performance measure studied. 
Evidence regarding the type of owner, shows companies held by the State have better 
performance on average. 
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The corporate governance was once defined as "the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled" (Cadbury Committee, 1992) and is still the most usual definition. 
In other words, it is not just the directors’ obligations in the company to suit stockholders, 
as it “involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined.” (OECD, 2004), and consists of 
the entire structuring and controlling of the company. 
One of the most discussed points in corporate governance is the principal-agent issue. In 
firms where there is a separation of ownership and management, and the shareholders do 
not have control, the issue arises among the management, which may have very different 
interests than shareholders. The greater danger comes from the possibility that rather than 
overseeing management on behalf of shareholders, the board may become subordinated to 
management (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
A major point of discussions focuses on the impact of a corporate governance system on 
financial and economical efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders' welfare 
(Bowen, 1994). 
The question of this research is how the adopted corporate governance measures explain 
the financial performance of the companies. This study will focus on the German market, 
and will comprehend the companies of the HDAX index, that comprises the 110 
companies. This index aggregates the DAX, MDAX – the 30 and 50 largest traded 
companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock exchange, respectively – and TecDAX – the 30 
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largest technology shares in Prime Standard below DAX. It has the 110 most highly 
quoted companies on the segment of blue chips considered as Prime Standard companies 
and thus is an established indicator for the performance of the German economy as a 
whole. 
1.1 Problem Statement and Importance of the Research 
There is not one system of governance better than the rest, the Germanic model is the one 
used by companies in the German market, and although some authors may defend it as the 
most efficient model one cannot state it with absolute certain. A necessity of a taxonomy 
that brings up the advantages and disadvantages of each systems of governance is 
essential, and it is as important to developed and acknowledge what variables affect the 
system. In Germany there are some studies about the Germanic governance model but it is 
not clear what variables have greater impact on the financial and economic performance 
measures and what differences do those variables make on the companies of the same 
index and country. 
There are several theories in corporate governance: theories of the company, theories of 
corporate governance models, theories of management and so on. Despite that, some of 
the theories contradict each others and there is no evidence that one should follow any of 
them without questioning. Recently there have been some financial scandals, undermining 
some theories and policies of the governance models that qualify themselves as the better 
ones, or seen by the researchers and those with knowledge in the area, as well structured 
and reliable models. Corporate governance has been seen as one of the most controversial 
areas of corporate finance in the last years, maybe because of these scandals that shocked 
the world, or other smaller cases that had impact only some countries, and crucial to 
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companies to make sustained and “good looking” decisions regain the trust of investors 
and improve their results. 
Some of the variables studied in those theories will be deeply tested in this study. 
I will take into account the main points of the German legislation about corporate 
governance and how it limits the power of companies to make their decisions about it. 
This study will try to answer some questions with lack of studies as if employee 
representation on the board influences performance? Or support others previously studied 
as: How can the number of members in the board influence the performance of the 
company? Finally the principal focus and the main question of this study is to understand 
what are the variables that have a greater impact on a firm’s performance and what 
policies the companies should take into consideration. 
This research will take into account past theories, make a compilation and test some 
hypotheses, using an econometric model that will show which variables are significant. 
Research on corporate governance is not only of theoretical importance, but of practical 
importance as well. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theories of Corporate Governance 
Starting the review of the existing literature (see Appendix 1, table 1 for a summary), we 
have an overview of the Managerial Revolution with the study of Alfred Chandler Jr 
(1977) in the United States in a research with three major chapters. First chapter explain 
the emergence of the first multi-unit business, with several operating units geographically 
dispersed, which led to the need of a managerial hierarchy to oversee their activities and 
mostly adopt an offensive strategy of expansion. Then, the Ascendancy of the Manager 
JOÃO FERNANDES                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE IMPACT ON GERMAN                                                         
                                                                        COMPANIES’ PERFORMANCE 
4 
 
chapter shows how the modern business, in which the managers held the corporations, 
took the position of the previously consensual family or financial held companies during 
the 20
th
 century. The influence of the employees began to grow and the Government 
intervention became scarcer. For the last chapter the author states the managerial 
capitalism started in the US because of its size and type of market and took longer on 
Europe and Japan because of their dominant family capitalism. Now, we need to 
understand the theories regarding corporate governance, and this will be divided in the 
central theory, the theories that conflict with it, and finally the most recent developments 
and achievements regarding the theories and governance systems. 
In Corporate Governance we can consider one theory as one of the oldest and during a 
long time most widely adopted and consensual among researchers of the field, it is the 
Agency Theory. Its first appearance dated 1932 by a Berle & Means (1932) study, 
coming from the so fashionable discussion of the separation of ownership and control. The 
concept of Modern Corporation, where the capital requirements led to the need of 
separating the principal from the contracted agent in order to maximize all shareholders 
utility, instead of just the owners’ wealth. Later in 1965, Adolf A. Berle (1965) continued 
its research on the flaws of the Classical economic view, in the form of a response to the 
Neoclassicist Peterson (1965). This essay explains that Peterson’s neoclassical theory is 
wrong in some aspects, mostly in the conclusions that investment, production and 
distribution, and the position of ownership maintained in the traditional way. First, the 
author presents some fact phenomena, amongst which the large corporations dominance of 
the market decisions, distributions of ownership between individual and institutional 
stockholders, the increase in the personal-owned wealth and the accumulating depreciation 
allowances and undistributed profits as major source of capital, while the Classical 
economic theory considers no such changes. In the second topic the author explains that 
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the shift in Capitalism control is a consummated process with the raise of managers’ 
control on the companies’ decision making process and the stockholders minor importance 
on strategic decisions. Then the immutability of classical economic principles as 
Competition and Maximization of profit need to be modernized in order to achieve the 
objectives. Finally, the last statement is that in terms of injecting capital into corporations, 
stock market is residual, because the invested money doesn’t go to the company, it only 
changes hands. In 1976, post World War II, Jensen & Meckling (1976) made a great 
contribution to the Agency Theory, defining the principal-agent relationship as: 
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, 
there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal.” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
With this relationship arise the agency costs as monitoring and bonding expenses and the 
residual loss. Jensen & Meckling also developed the “ownership structure” of the firm, 
replacing the term “capital structure”, including to the structure of debt and equity, the 
separation of equity, the part held by managers (inside equity) and the portion held by 
outside investors (outside equity). Another significant aspect of their research was the 
establishment of a new definition for the firm, a set of contracts among individual 
production factors with the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash 
flows, in contrast to the single product entity with the purpose of maximization of profits 
on the classical vision (Clarke, 2004). Fama & Jensen (1983) focused on the separation of 
the three major functions of agents, the decision making, the decision control and the 
residual risk bearing and if it’s appliance is better than the combination of all functions on 
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the same agent. For some types of corporations as financial mutuals and large professional 
partnerships, amongst others, they concluded the combination of management and risk 
bearing, controlling the agency problems, would be efficient. While on small partnerships 
and closed corporations the combination of management and control functions, restricting 
residual claims, would bring potential benefits. Just like other studies, Fama & Jensen 
(1983) suggest internal and external corporate governance instruments as the presence of a 
board of directors to monitor the executives decisions.  Another mechanism is the 
existence of golden parachutes, proposed by Jensen (1984). Finally, we can find some 
proponents and some critics to this theory, as Eisenhardt (1989), who asserts the theory at 
some point resembles to political models in the matter of the self-interested behavior with 
the purpose of reaching individual utility which leads to conflicting situations. Another 
importance of the theory is it proffers understanding of information asymmetries, risk 
bearing, corporate control and incentives in organizations. At the same time, other authors 
argue the theory is limited because it diminishes the company to two members only, 
managers and shareholders, acknowledging them as “self-interested humans, unwilling to 
sacrifice personal interest” in the behalf of the corporation (Daily et al, 2003) and further 
the assumption of the utility-maximizing self-interested human behavior which is 
inaccurate and the propensity to see the firm in contractual terms only (Learmount, 2002). 
The Agency approach was not consensual, therefore some theories opposing it arose; the 
first we will talk about is the Stewardship Theory. 
Donaldson & Davis (1991) contested the agency theory affirming the hypothesis of the 
managers serving their own interests and gains goes against what they consider as 
essential, maximize the shareholders value and by consequence the managers’ utility 
functions. In the Stewardship theory these managers are the stewards, who understand that 
by working in a collectivist way and achieving the organizations' goals will provide them 
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a greater utility, this way they have an extensive authority and lower temptation to act to 
their own goals, consequently stewards are trustworthy and the costs of monitoring them 
will be reduced. Later, Davis et al (1997) have compared the two theories psychologically, 
characterizing the stewards by their reaction to intrinsic rewards and high value 
commitment with the corporation, in opposition to the agents that react to extrinsic 
rewards and externalize organizational results avoiding the blame. 
Concluding the study, the authors propose a way to chose between theories, by assessing 
the motivations of managers - who can choose to behave as stewards or as agents - and 
shareholders to understand the relationship among them. If both behave in agreement, 
choosing the agency theory the costs of the firm will be minimized in order to achieve the 
best short-run results, if they act according the stewardship theory the lung-run 
sustainability and potential performance will be maximized. Finally, if they oppose each 
other, who chooses the stewardship is the one betrayed and the one who chooses agency is 
considered to be opportunistic. 
Then the second group of theories criticize the agency in what the directors’ role in the 
company should be, the Managerial Hegemony, has in Mace one of its supporters. 
Mace (1971) starts his study stating there is plenty of literature regarding the boards of 
directors but in his vision the problem is that these studies lack on the specification of the 
boards’ appropriate functions, and the author tries to understand the behaviour of the 
directors. There are two aspects, according to Mace, that can affect the roles of the 
directors: their process of selection and their motivation to the proposed position. What 
they understand directors should do is to define strategies, policies, be involved on the 
decision-making process of the company, define its strategies and policies and stipulate 
accurateness levels to the managers and CEO. But in its view they are much more limited 
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because, in general, the directors have three actual functions on the company: advice, be 
an example of discipline to the president and lower managers and decision-making in 
crises situations only. Finally, Mace concludes directors are dispensable on the company 
since their part is almost irrelevant even stating they are just ornaments. In time of crisis 
there is a strong possibility of collision between the CEO/Chairman and the directors of a 
company, especially if they have different visions on what is best for the company. In 
order to solve that it is necessary to understand clearly what the tasks and power of each 
intervenient are. After the perspective of Mace on this subject Lorsh et al (1989) 
acknowledged the opinion of the Business Round who state the directors should supervise 
management and corporate social responsibility, with a different perspective the American 
Law Institute, yet a compatible view: elect, evaluate and dismiss the executives are the 
responsibilities of the directors. After analyzing the regulations, the authors claim an 
urgent need for change on the rules of governance of the stock exchanges and the 
corporations’ laws. By supporting the managers’ importance in the firm, the Upper 
Echelons Theory view collides with the Agency view. 
The analysis of Hambrick et al (1984) on the upper echelons focuses not only on the chief 
executive office but on the entire top management body. Their first objective was to find 
characteristics that can link top managers to each others as much as characteristics that 
tear them appart and from that point undestand which ones are relevant to the company’s 
strategies. They developed a model to understand how the organizational outcomes are 
related to the charateristics of its top managers, always with special attention on their roots 
and background rather than psychological aspects. More specifically they present some 
hypothesis, amongst them are age, functional track, other career experiences, formal 
education, socioeconomic background, financial position and group heterogeneity.  
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In 2007, Hambrick (2007) wrote an update to his previous article in which the main 
improvement on his study is the new variables, introducing the managerial discretion and 
the type of market the company operates in (as prominent of the top managers’ decisions), 
influencing the theory’s predictive strength. Other matters are integrated as if the 
managers’ behaviour is innate or persuaded and the discussion about the executive’s 
impact in different counties’ systems. Besides that the author reinforces that focusing on 
the top managers instead of just the chief executive will provide stronger evidence and 
explains the theory proposes executives - as result of their background experiences and 
values - act based on their personnel interpretation of the companies’ dilemmas. 
So far, we just mentioned theories oriented to understand the behavior of organizations 
internally and in terms of intentional managerial decision making, but now we will focus 
on the theories of External Pressures, more oriented to a different dimension of 
governance acknowledging the relations with the external environment. Supporters of this 
theory state the importance of directors in a mission other than monitoring and 
supervisory. As Hillman et al (2000) said the directors of the board may provide better 
relationships with other social groups. In theory, more directors create links and cover 
more external resources, acting to reduce uncertainty. In addition, some authors as 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Pfeffer (1972) argue that internal managerial decisions 
are made to match external demands; inclusively Boards’ size and composition are 
“rational organizational responses to the conditions of the external environment”. Jones et 
al (1997) explain what is the network oriented system, where they identify some key 
aspects: patterns of interaction with informal collaborations within firms and long term 
exchanges that creates inter dependency; flow of resources between independent and 
separate units. In their words, network governance is a “select, persistent, and structured 
set of autonomous firms” therefore one cannot call an “industry or region a "network" 
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without examining relations among the firms and how these relations complete a product 
or service.” According to Jones et al. (1997), network oriented system as the one in 
Germany, is “suited for industries with high levels of demand uncertainty, short product 
life cycles and where the rapid dissemination of information is critical” and is also 
increasing its importance, even they are difficult to implement, will become widespread in 
short time.  
This transports us to the Stakeholders Theory, one of the theories that more directly 
opposes to the Agency theory, arguing the view of pursuing shareholder value and that 
stockholders are the only important individuals is wrong because all stakeholders, or all 
agents directly or indirectly related to the company are important and must be taken into 
consideration. Stakeholder Theory didn’t had much interest of the managers until recently, 
when Freeman had his first research on the topic. Freeman & Reed (1983) considered two 
types of stakeholders: the internal stakeholders - the stockholders, managers and 
employees - which relationship create the strategic prospect for the company; and the 
external stakeholders, basically individuals who are indirectly related with the firm as 
suppliers, competitors and special interest groups, and are restrained by formal and 
informal policies (see Freeman, 1994). On 1996 Margaret Blair (1996) agreed with 
Freeman and Reed in the point that corporations should be considered as “arrangements 
for governing the relationships between all of the parties that contribute with specific 
assets to the firm” rather than just assets belonging to the shareholders. More recently 
Thomas Clarke (1998) defended major companies gave great importance to internal 
stakeholders as employees but also to external as customers and suppliers, showing 
leading companies have been adopting the stakeholders theory for longer time. 
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Recently a stream defending the convergence of the corporate governance systems form 
all countries to the Anglo-Saxon system. According to Nestor & Thompson (2000), the 
globalization of market capitals, new financial instruments and international competition 
are some of the causes to the pressures companies have been suffering to adapt their 
governance and to converge to the Anglo-Saxon model, while Useem (1998) highlighted 
the opening of the markets and the attenuation of the national limits. Despite that some 
authors don’t agree with them, Guillen (1999), Rhodes & Apeldoorn (1998) and Branson 
(2001) are some examples of the skeptics about the convergence affirming corporations 
are dependent from legal and institutional practices and political  dynamics. In addition 
even if the market is going into a more liberal state, the countries models and their past-
dependence will drive them to an adjustment to the evolution of the economy and finance, 
not to a complete convergence. In 1999, OECD (1999a) tried to guide companies in 
different countries in order to deviate them from the total convergence of the practices but 
to lead them to the principles of responsibility and transparency. 
Finally, some authors confront the evolution of the companies’ strategy with the problems 
of the shareholder value pursuit. Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000) made a critique of 
shareholder value and started their work with an important analysis to understand how 
the evolution of the strategy of the companies in the United States was from 1960 when 
the strategies of the corporations were oriented toward retention of the earnings to reinvest 
(retain and reinvest) them with the purpose of corporate growth but it ran into problems 
that led to its end. First the problem of too much growth with “too many divisions in too 
many different types of businesses” which make that the central offices were far from the 
operations and couldn’t make smart decisions in order to explore the retain and reinvest 
strategy. This resulted in poor performance and showed the way to the origin of new and 
innovative competitors, the second problem. Primarily Japan challenged the US in 
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industries they were leaders for many years as in the mass production industry of 
automobile and electronics. Struggling with these problems, a group of economists came 
up with a new theory, the agency theory in the 1980 decade when top managers were 
under considerable pressure to adopt a shareholder value orientation; in Europe managers 
felt the same pressure in order to have credibility among the international markets and 
believed the maximization of shareholder value (downsize and distribute) was a principle 
of good governance.  
They came up with some conclusions about the sustainability of the economy relating to 
the maximisation of shareholder. They affirm the foundations of the current prosperity 
may not be a result from this strategy as some economists say, “the prosperity of Silicon 
Valley in the 1990s owes more to the postwar "military industrial complex" in which 
"retain and reinvest" corporations were central than it does to a resurgence of 
entrepreneurship”. Finally, they attack the strategy stating that companies are completely 
dependent of the performance of the stock market, some even finance themselves by the 
willingness of employees of accepting shares as compensation, and do not know their 
capacity to keep supporting it through downsize and distribution. Ending up suggesting 
that the pursuit of the shareholder value is a strategy for running down a company and “the 
pursuit of some other kind of value is needed to build up a company and an economy”. 
After the Enron bankruptcy some authors published articles countering the hypothesis of 
convergence of all models to the Anglo-Saxon enhancing some problems of the model and 
the policies companies’ have been following. The article of Jeffrey N. Gordon (2002) 
enhanced some problems of the model. First, concerning the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
the author concludes the market don’t understand the intrinsic value of the stock and its 
gap to the market price. Then he states the small independence of board members and their 
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lack of oversight of the managers and information provided. Then the Stock-based 
compensation is a reason to the crisis previously stated because of the high-power given to 
the executives, which is supposed to control the appeal of managers towards non ethic 
situations but instead of that, due to the excessive performance compensation values, the 
managers became risk-lovers taking projects with high risk. Last the employee stock 
ownership and retirement plans are criticized because the incentive purpose is almost null 
in the short run and carry a high degree of risk in the long run. To conclude, the author 
suggests there is evidence that the regulatory standards were poorly conceived and some 
concepts as directors’ independence need an adjustment. To complete the previous stated 
idea, John C. Coffee Jr (2003) highlights the problem of the market deregulation in the 
1990’s confronted with the evidence in the early 2000’s, and the problem of the executive 
increasing compensation at the same time as the decreasing CEO tenure, which led to the 
attempt of inflating earnings in the short run and overvaluation the companies’ stock 
prices. 
2.2 Taxonomy System 
In 1999, with the purpose of solving the problem of lack of a clear framework, Weimer & 
Pape published the study “A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance”
1
, 
classifying the industrialized countries in four groups: the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Latin 
and Japan system; which is based upon eight characteristics: the prevailing concept of the 
firm, the board system, the salient stakeholders able to exert influence on managerial 
decision-making, the importance of stock markets in the national economy, the presence 
or absence of an external market for corporate control, the ownership structure, the extent 
to which executive compensation is dependent on corporate performance, and the time 
                                                 
1
 See Table 2, Appendix 1, for a summary of the taxonomy of the systems. 
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horizon of economic relationships. The particular model adopted by the companies in 
Germany is the Germanic model along with other countries as Netherlands. This model 
states the firm is an autonomous economic entity which is constituted by a variety of 
members (stakeholders), such as “shareholders, corporate management, employees, 
suppliers of goods and services, suppliers of debt and customers, striving for the 
continuity of the firm as a whole” (Moerland, 1995a). La Porta (1999) found empirical 
results that companies with the Anglo-Saxon model are widely dispersed in constrast with 
German model companies that have the characteristic of high ownership concentration. 
The model has a Two-tier board system, with a management board (“Vorstand”) and 
supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”) providing a separation between management and 
supervision and the managers being appointed and dismissed by the supervisory board. 
The supervisory board composition reflects that employees and shareholders, along with 
industrial banks are salient stakeholders on the decision-making process. Stock markets 
play a small role in Germanic countries and “an active external market for corporate 
control is almost nonexistent”. The high concentration of ownership helps to have more 
mechanisms to influence managerial decision-making, while shareholder indentify helps 
to explain the network orientation on these countries with no need of a market for 
corporate control. Performance-based executive compensation is limited but is becoming 
more important. Finally, in Germany the stable shareholdings by banks or nonfinancial 
corporations as the influence of employees allow for stable and long economic 
relationships (Gelauff and Den Broeder, 1996).  
2.3 Law and Regulations 
To complete this literature review we covered the legislation of the country and the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance and came up with a brief analysis of the law and 
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regulation on companies’ governance, in order to understand what the state of art in 
Germany is. The Government Commission published the latest version of the German 
Corporate Governance Code on May of 2013 presenting some essential statutory 
regulations for good governance and states the obligations of the management and 
supervisory boards to ensure the sustainability and the creation of value for their company 
(see the evolution of regulations in Appendix 1, table 3). The code is targeted for all listed 
companies in the German stock exchange but is recommended for all other non-listed 
companies to follow it. A dual board system (two tired) is prescribed by law. The 
management board is comprised by executive members only, being responsible for 
independently manage the company and has a Chairman responsible for the coordination 
of their work. In the general meeting, the shareholders elect the members of the 
Supervisory Board which is responsible to appoint, supervise and advise the Management 
Board, it is also coordinated by its Chairman. Companies with more than 500 or 2000 
employees in Germany should also be represented in the Supervisory Board, having 1/3 or 
1/2 of the representatives respectively. In the last case and in the hypothesis of split in a 
decision to be made by the Supervisory Board, its Chairman has the casting vote. There 
are two types of proposals in the Code: the “recommendations” of which companies can 
deviate from if, disclosure it and justify the deviation (from here further stated as “comply 
or explain”), in order for the companies to reflect sector-specific requirements but all 
deviations from the code recommendations must be in the interest of transparency and 
good corporate governance; and the “suggestions” of which there is no need to disclosure 
any deviation from them.  
 Among the recommendations the most important in general and specifically to this study 
are: 
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The code suggests that every share is equal (using the principle one share, one vote), 
without multiple voting rights or preferential voting rights. Voting cap is also not used 
(see point 2.1.2). The Supervisory Board shall meet the number of times its Chairman 
finds appropriate and the meetings shall be attended by shareholders representatives and 
employee representatives and, if necessary, by the members of the Management Board 
(see points 3.2 and 3.6).The composition of the Boards somehow neglected by the code, 
simply aiming towards diversity, specifying the importance of women to be present but 
without stipulating a minimum number of females (see points 4.1.5 and 5.1.2). Similarly 
to point that can be considered very liberal which is 5.4.2 stating “The Supervisory Board 
shall include what it considers an adequate number of independent members.” what allows 
the companies to have a number of independent members not disclosed in their reports and 
investors don’t have access to that information since, very often, the companies only state 
there is an adequate number of independent members in the Supervisory Board. Finally, 
an age limit shall be specified in the company reports but there is no indication to a global 
limit for all companies mandated by the code. Relatively to compensation of the Boards it 
is very alike for the two of them, stating the mandatory conditions of stating individually 
performance and non-performance compensations, cash or other types (see points 4.2.2, 
4.2.3 and 5.4.6). Accordingly to the point “5.3 Formation of Committees” the Supervisory 
Board shall form committees depending on the number of members and the specifics of 
the enterprise. The code recommends the companies to form at least an Audit and a 
Nomination committee amongst others the Supervisory board think it’s necessary. 
Regarding mandatory disclosures, the code clearly states that whenever a threshold (3, 5, 
10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 or 75 % of the voting rights in the company) is exceeded or falls 
below by a single entity (person or company), the Management Board is responsible for 
disclosing the fact on the date (see point 6.2 of the code). If the members of the 
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Management Board and Supervisory Board together, directly or indirectly, hold more than 
1% of the shares issued by the company, this shall be reported individually for all 
members in the annual report (see point 6.6 of the Code). 
3. Data Description 
After the review of the existing literature, and in order to perform an empirical analysis, I 
need to proceed by indentifying three points. 
First I need to identify about what companies to select as the focus of this study, to do that 
I chose an index based on two criteria points: the importance of the index in the stock 
market and economy of the country and the extent of the index. The chosen index was 
HDAX, since it covers the majority of the market capitalization listed in Germany, which 
allows having a wider perspective of the market, and it is comprised by the 110 biggest 
listed companies in Germany, which is a sufficiently large sample to obtain a robust 
econometric analysis. Second, the decision about what type of format of the data led to the 
balanced panel data in order to avoid problems of model specification and some statistical 
tests to be run. Third, the time period thought to be adequate to perform a robust analysis 
and enough to dilute the effect of the financial crisis in 2008. 
Therefore I acknowledge what companies were present in the index in every year from 
2005 until 2012 and included them; the ones not present in the index at least in one of the 
years were excluded from the sample. 
With the sample being balanced, other adjustments were made. We followed the approach 
of some authors and excluded financial companies such as banks and insurance companies 
from the sample. As Rajan & Zingales (1995) said, this type of companies’ “leverage is 
strongly influenced by explicit (or implicit) investor insurance schemes such as deposit 
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insurance. Furthermore, their debt-like liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt 
issued by nonfinancial firms. Finally, regulations such as minimum capital requirements 
may directly affect capital structure”, also Fama & French (2002) argued “Excluding 
financials and utilities may also go a long way toward alleviating any omitted variable 
problems”. The next step was to eliminate companies with headquarters outside Germany 
– which don’t have to comply with the German CG code – since the majority of important 
non-financial information is not disclosed, such as shareholder structure and individual 
remuneration. With all adjustments made, our sample is comprised to a total of 61 
companies along eight years, with 53 indicators (possible variables), of which I expect 9 
of them to be dependent variables and 44 independent variables, obviously this is not the 
final sample because it has excessive variables and it suffered a process of elimination 
explained later in the methodology (See Appendix 2, Table 4 and 5). The data used in this 
sample construction was obtained in the consolidated financial statements, which 
according to previous researches have superior value relevance in relation with Company 
Parent ones (i.e. individual accounts). In addition, Jyrki Niskanen et al (1994) stated 
“Consolidated earnings are informative because they reflect the economic performance of 
the entire economic entity where investors hold their equity claims” and their study 
provide evidence that consolidated earnings are a significant incremental explanatory 
variable while individual accounts are not. Apart from annual reports, information about 
the market obtained from Thomson Reuters database was used. 
4. Variables and Hypotheses 
4.1 Measuring Performance 
In corporate governance studies, as in any other study dealing with performance there are 
some measures generally accepted amongst authors: productivity, valuation, profitability, 
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growth; are all measures of firm performance, each of them more related to the 
specification of the companies and sector they are in, also to the companies objectives. 
1. Return on equity (ROE) 
Brown and Caylor (2004) used in their study, among others, return on equity as 
performance measure, they based their choice arguing it captures corporate governance 
mechanisms, which reduces the control rights managers exert on companies, being 
obligated to pursue investments with higher value which is reflected in operating 
performance, they followed other authors such as Shleifer & Vishny (1997). 
Another authors also use ROE when measuring performance and relating it with 
governance practices, such as Donaldson & Davis (1991) and Damodaran (2007) who 
states “the return on equity focuses on just the equity component of the investment.” 
2. Return on assets (ROA) 
Following the thought of Barber & Lyon (1996) and Bhagat & Bolton (2009), with the last 
considering ROA as their primary measure of firm operating performance, I decided to use 
the same variable, since the return on assets ratio can show how profitable a 
company's assets are in generating revenue and “also has more desirable distributional 
properties than the return on equity measure” (Core et al, 2006. pp. 666-667). According 
to Core et al (2006), “to the extent that governance affects firm performance through 
capital expenditure programs, depreciation expense is an important component of a firm’s 
performance”. 
3. Tobin’s Q 
As a financial firm performance measure Tobin’s q is the chosen variable in this study, in 
order to relate the market value of a company and the replacement value of the firm’s 
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assets. In 1968 James Tobin, Nobel in economics, came up with a new hypothesis that the 
combined market value of all the companies on the stock market would be equal to the 
replacement costs of their assets (Tobin & Brainard 1968). In 1981 Lindenberg & Ross 
(1981) introduce the Tobin’s Q ratio in their paper using the same ratio proposed by 
Tobin. Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) “investigate the relationship between 
management ownership and market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's Q”. 
Finally, and being the approach used in this study, Kaplan & Zingales (1997) came up 
with a different way of calculating Tobin’s Q, which was generally accepted and followed  
by most authors since then, such as Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003) and more recently 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008). Following their approach, this study measures Tobin’s Q as the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (Appendix 2, Table 6). 
4.2 Explanatory Variables 
In the empirical analysis of the study I will try to find and explain the relationship of the 
chosen independent governance variables and the performance variables. 
Board Size. In this study Board size is a scale measure (1… n), this variable is on the 
group of board of directors’ composition, which include some of the most important 
variables in governance to explain performance. Some authors affirm board size is related 
to firm performance as Jensen (1993), arguing small boards “can help improve their 
performance” and Raheja (2005) stating the optimal board size is dependent on the firm 
characteristics. Even empirical studies on board size reveal a link with performance 
(Anderson et al., 2004). 
Board Independence. The independence of corporate boards has received much attention 
in recent research, with the term “independent” having different concepts: “What 
constitutes an “independent director” follows from definitions in leading codes of best 
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practice.” Johanson & Ostergren (2010), with different definitions across countries. 
Summarizing, Bhagat & Black (1998) state there is “evidence, on the relationship between 
board independence and firm behavior and performance. The variable is defined as a 
percentage according to Bhagat & Bolton (2008), “The number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of board members”, being this definition the one I chose. 
Employee Representation. The presence of representatives of employees on the board 
“proxies the ability of nonexecutive employees to influence decision making within a 
firm’s board of directors” (Guedri & Hollandts, 2008). Board employee representation 
varies widely across countries, in some countries, like USA there is absolutely no 
representation of employees in the board, whereas Germany has very high, legally 
mandated, levels of representation. There is still some countries, like France, in-between 
the others with both mandatory and chosen representation. Board employee representation 
is accounted here with a ratio between the number of directors representing employees and 
the total number of directors sitting on a firm’s board. 
Percentage of Female Board Members. Shrader et al (1997) investigate the relationship 
between the percentage of female board members and two accounting measures of 
financial value (ROA and ROE) and found interesting evidence. Adams & Ferreira (2009) 
and Carter, Simkins, & Simpson (2003) also study the presence of females on the board of 
directors, (which decided to use it as a dummy variable). In this study it is a used as a 
percentage. 
Supervisory Board Variable Remuneration. In the AFEP/MEDEF corporate 
governance code of good practices is enhanced the importance of boards variable 
compensation and what it should consider to its calculation.  
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It should take account, in such ways as it shall determine, of the directors' attendance at 
meetings of the Board and committees, and therefore include a variable portion. It seems 
natural that the directors' attendance at meetings of specialized committees should be 
rewarded with an additional amount of directors’ fees. Corporate Governance code of 
listed corporations (June 2013), pp. 19. 
Age of CEO. Hambrick & Mason (1984) argue that: The association between the age of 
top executives and organizational characteristics has not been the subject of many studies, 
but the few that exist yield strikingly consistent results: managerial youth appears to be 
associated with corporate growth (Child, 1974, Hart & Mellons, 1970) (…) A related 
finding of these studies is that volatility of sales and earnings also is associated with 
managerial youth. So, what emerges is a picture of youthful managers attempting the 
novel, the unprecedented, taking risks. Hambrick & Mason (1984), pp. 198. 
We will see if it is related to other performance measures besides company growth. 
Type of Ownership. This is a categorical variable with the type of owner of the 
corporation. Following La Porta et al. (1999), “To describe control of companies, we 
generally look for all shareholders who control over 10 percent of the votes. The cutoff of 
10 percent is used because (1) it provides a significant threshold of votes”.
2
 
Board Ownership. The variable is accounted as the mean value (in euros) of common 
stocks owned by directors. Bhagat & Bolton (2009) focus on the “dollar value rather than 
percentage of ownership because it serves as a more direct measure of incentives to the 
director.” 
                                                 
2
 The different types of owners are described in Table 3, Appendix 2. 
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Shareholder Concentration. Guedri & Hollandts (2008) define a variable of “ownership 
concentration captured by the percentage of stock held by the largest shareholder”, 
following McConnell & Servaes (1990)."  
4.3 Control Variables 
Along with the explanatory variables, other variables were introduced in order to control 
some undesired effects of the data, the companies’ structure and market conditions. The 
control variables present in the model are Net Assets and Firm Size. Firm size is a very 
important variable because of its risk-neutral effect on corporate ownership that is used for 
most firm-level studies because of its risk-neutral effect on corporate ownership (Demsetz 
& Lehn, 1985). Economies of scale and scope are present in large companies, which 
impacts on firm performance. The logarithm of the book value of total assets is the most 
used in this topic; many authors, such as Thomsen and Pedersen (1996), Renneboog 
(2000), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Bauer et al. (2004) use this variable as a proxy for 
firm size. 
5. Hypotheses 
The problems between governance and performance cannot be fully explained nor solved 
but there are some empirical studies and respective propositions that affirm some practices 
can help to do so
3
. Table 7, Appendix 2, shows the summary of the Hypotheses. 
The number of board members is often more than the optimal to perform effectively, 
reaching a point where firm value is decreased, according to Jensen (1993), which I chose 
to test since it has the more studies supporting it. In line with previous studies, such as 
Yermack (1996), Bhagat and Black (2002), the hypothesis bellow have the purpose of 
                                                 
3
 In every hypothesis when stating ‘firm performance’ it is referring to ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. All tests 
were performed for each dependent variable separately. 
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testing the relationship between the board size and proxy measures of firm performance. 
Nevertheless some authors affirm board size affects positively the performance (Adams & 
Mehran, 2005; Jay Dahya et al, 2007; Cole et al, 2007). 
Hypothesis 1: The size of the board of directors is negatively related to performance. 
Independent board members (or board outsiders) are expected to give an outside view and 
more active monitoring of the board decisions (Jensen and Fama, 1983) and lead to higher 
rate of replacement of management when performance is poor (Renneboog, 2000). By 
contrast many authors found a negative relation between independence and firm 
performance, as Bhagat & Black (2002) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) attributing it to the 
wider separation of ownership and control. Although there are different opinions I 
understand that Board Independence is crucial to firm performance, going in line with 
Internacional guidelines of OECD. 
Hypothesis 2: Board independence increases firm performance. 
Recently, companies have been giving more importance to the presence of women in 
corporate boards. Carter, Simkins, & Simpson (2003) found positive relationships between 
the fraction of women on the board and firm value. According to a study of Borisova 
(2012) companies with highest percent of women in top management, within each 
industry, have a ROE 41% higher than firms without women on top management. 
(Borisova & Sterkhova, 2012). 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage of women in the board has a positive effect on firm’s financial 
performance. 
Guedri & Hollandts (2008) define: "the inflection point in the inverted U-shaped 
relationship will occur at lower levels of employee stock ownership in the case of 
employee board representation than otherwise. Indeed, the magnitude of the negative force 
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generated by managerial entrenchment and employee participation in strategic decision 
making is further amplified if employees are represented on the board of directors by a 
nonexecutive employee". The author hypothesizes the presence of employee 
representation level impacts on the relationship between employee stock ownership and 
performance. Considering the view of the author, this study proposes a related, yet 
different, approach to the hypothesis, in order to explore this relationship and somehow 
innovate. 
Hypothesis 4: Employee board representation level has a positive on impact firm’s performance. 
The empirical corporate governance literature offers no unequivocal answer to the costs 
and benefits of concentrated ownership. Some scholars have found benefits to 
performance (La Porta et al, 1999), while others found negative effects (Loderer and 
Martin, 1997; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Considering the arguments in favour and against 
ownership concentration as well as previous findings I found the arguments in favour are 
stronger and more consistent, therefore this study proposes the following: 
Hypothesis 5: Firm’s performance are positively affected by ownership concentration. 
 The approach here was to use the classification of La Porta et al. (1999):  
To describe control of companies, we generally look for all shareholders who control over 
10 percent of the votes. The cutoffs of 10 percent is used because it provides a significant 
threshold of votes; and most countries mandate disclosure of 10 percent, and usually even 
lower, ownership stakes.  La Porta et al (1999), pp 8. 
Following the information on Weimer & Pape (1999), whom state in Germanic models 
banks often have equity ownership, supervisory boards seats and voting rights, the 
hypothesis was formulated. 
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Hypothesis 6: Performance indicators are positively affected is companies are held by financial 
institutions. 
 The association between the age of top executives and organizational characteristics has 
not been the subject of many studies, but the few researches about the subject present 
consistent results: managerial youth appears to be associated with corporate growth but 
also with volatility of sales and earnings (Child, 1974; Hart & Mellons, 1970). So, what 
emerges is a picture of youthful managers attempting the novel, the unprecedented, taking 
risks. Following the literature but using different performance dependent variables, this 
study hypothesizes the following: 
Hypothesis 7: Firm’s performance is positively affected by younger CEOs. 
 The relationship between stock ownership of top management and corporate performance 
has been deeply studied by economists. Findings have been mixed, but the costs and 
benefits are unequivocally defined. Inquiry into the issue has been prompted largely by the 
Berle and Means (1932) thesis that owners have a greater stake in the firm than do non-
owners and so will engage in more purely income-seeking behaviour. Some scholars have 
found a positive association with corporate performance (La Porta et al, 2000) and others 
negative association (Loderer and Martin, 1997). With the available evidence about stock 
ownership, and accepting the propose of La Porta which I think is the more accurate, I 
came to the following proposition: 
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relationship between stock ownership of board members 
concentration and  Tobin’s Q. 
Because of bonuses and other incentive compensation plans, managers’ income often 
varies with corporate performance (Lewellyn, 1969; Lewellyn & Huntsman, 1970; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984), while they also run the risk of being fired if firm performance 
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falls off a risk that owner-managers do not face (James & Soref, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1980). Previous studies focused on managers variable remuneration, but since in Germany 
the two tiered system is mandatory, we decided to study this relationship but using the 
variable remuneration in supervisory board, to have a new perspective. 
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relationship between Supervisory Board variable remuneration 
and firm’s performance. 
6. Methodology 
All the aspects of governance and performance were discussed, allowing me to proceed 
with an empirical investigation. In this section I’ll describe the process from the finish of 
the database creation until the final statistical model conception that will allow the 
empirical analysis and interpretation of the results. 
After creating the database there were too many variables to study, 53 indicators (possible 
variables), of which 9 expected to be dependent variables and 44 independent variables 
and most probably would cause a lot of problems to the model, therefore we had to filter it 
to separate the relevant from the irrelevant variables. The final variables, dependent and 
explanatory, were chosen, without exception, basing the decision on the existing literature 
emphasizing the studied theories, following, in part, the criteria proposed by Studenmund 
(2000), the irrelevant variables in explaining the dependent variables in analysis were 
removed. This process was carried out until reaching the final variables for this study. To 
understand if the OLS estimator is BLUE (Gauss Markov Theorem), under assumptions 





                                                 
4
 All tests were performed individually for each dependent variable equation with all the independent 
variables. 
5
 Variables that violates MLR.3 (No Perfect Collinearity) were removed, using the software STATA tools. 
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First, I need to test the RE against the FE estimator in order to see which type of 
endogeneity is present and which estimator better fit the data. So a Hausman test, which 
tests if the unique errors      are correlated with the regressors (MLR. 4), was performed 
with the null hypothesis of the difference in coefficients not being systematic in order to 
choose between the Fixed Effects estimator and the Random effects estimator. Since the 
previous test did not reject the null hypothesis for the equations of ROE and ROA as 
dependent variables (see Table 8, Appendix 3), I cannot conclude FE is better fitted 
model, although the equation with Tobin’s Q rejected the null, hence I should use FE. 
Then I ran a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test to decide between a Random effects 
regression and a simple OLS regression for the first two equations. With this test is 
possible to see if there is evidence of significant difference across units (panel effect), 
which will inform if the random effects is appropriate for the data. After that, and since the 
previous test rejected the null hypothesis of variances across entities being zero for both 
equations (see Table 9, Appendix 3), I could decide which estimator to use in each 
equation (with the different dependent variables), and more tests were conducted. 
Using the Breusch-Pagan LM test for independence (B-P/LM), with the null hypothesis of 
residuals across entities not being correlated, I found if contemporaneous correlation  is 
present in the data, in other words if error across sections are dependent
6
. Using the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, with the null hypothesis of 
constant variance (i.e. homoskedasticity), allows me to conclude if the assumption MLR.5 
(Homoskedasticity) is violated (Table 10, Appendix 3). Then following Wooldridge 
(2002), I tested the null hypothesis of no first order correlation (AR (1)). (See Table 11, 
Appendix 3) 
                                                 
6
 Since the test gave an error, results didn’t provided results, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The 
errors across sections were assumed to be independent. 
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Finally, after performing all tests, I ran the adequate model to correct the problems present 
in the data. The chosen model is the Random effects (for equation 1 and 2) and Fixed 
effects estimator (for equation 3) with clustered data. When computing the standard errors 
and the variance-covariance estimates, using the fixed/random effects robust cluster 
estimator, it assumes the disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic and present 
autocorrelation (see Table 13, Appendix 4). With this model the problems of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of type AR (1) are solved, also decreasing the 
standard errors and the model is better specified providing better analysis. The general 
form for the regressions are: 
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Table 12, Appendix 4, presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample. It presents a 
great variance on the independent percentage of directors (0,14-0,91) which shows the 
freedom the code gives in this subject. It also shows the mean value of female board 
members (6 per cent) which is not very high, although it had been increasing in the last 
years. Also, rejecting Weimer & Pape (1999), companies held by financial institutions is 
only the third larger type. Finally the median values of CEO age, shareholder 
concentration and board ownership are behind (and far) from their average, indicating a lot 
of low values and few, but really high observations. 
Table 14 and Table 15, Appendix 4, summarizes the results on the models from the OLS, 
FE/RE effects. In Table 16, Appendix 4, I report the results for the relationship between 
return on equity (ROE, Model 1), operating performance (ROA, Model 2), Tobin’s Q 
(Model 3), and the governance measures respectively. Given that the data relates to 61 
firms over eight years (2005–2012), I employed the Fixed and Random effects estimators, 
corrected for any latent heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Multicollinear 
variables were omitted from the model. Tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
showed evidence of their presence (Appendix 3, Table 10 and Table 11). For every 
dependent variable I estimated three models; first the regular Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), second a regular FE/RE and finally the FE/RE with clustered data (results from all 
models are present in tables X,Y,Z). Model 1 and Model 2 present very similar results, 
therefore their analysis will be combined, and on the other hand, Model 3 has very 
particular outcomes, so it has a different analysis. Board size is a variable with ambiguous 
results, having positive coefficient in Model 2 but negative with Model 1, although they 
are very close to zero, in addition it is not statistically significant, therefore we cannot 
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corroborate our hypothesis. Board independence and percentage of female board 
members, all have negative coefficients, both in Model 1 and in Model 2. Although they 
are not statistically significant, their coefficient signs agree to hypotheses 2 and go against 
hypotheses 3 and 5. Board Ownership has negative coefficient in both Model 1 and 2, and 
are significant at 5% level, against my hypothesis 8, showing boards detaining stock don’t 
mean better performance, and that members of the board being somehow ‘owners’ of the 
company could arise problems. At a 5% level in Model 1 and 2, the results regarding 
Employee Representation agrees to my proposition 4, associating higher levels of 
representation of employees in the board with better performance of the firm  (Model 1: 
β=0,101, p<0,05; Model 2: β=0,055; p<0,05). Although results are close zero (the 
conclusions are not strongly consistent), the coefficients of the Supervisory Board 
Variable Remuneration in both models are positive and significant at 1% for Models 1 and 
2, corroborating the proposition in this study (Model 1: β=7,02E-05; Model 2: β=9,07E-
04). With significance at 5% (Model 2) and 1% (Model 1) levels and positive coefficients 
(Model 1: β=0,004; Model 2: β=0,002), these findings confirm some authors who argue 
elder CEOs provide better and more stable performance, probably through their aversion 
to risk and bolder approaches and their preference for more consistent strategies and less 
aggressive decisions. These results, however, reject the hypothesis tested in this research 
and the opinion of Child (1974). The concentration of the shareholdings in the company 
just offer significant evidence to its performance in Model 1, besides that it has positive 
coefficients which is in agreement to some authors (La Porta et al, 2000; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) and the research hypothesis. Finally, the 
categorical variable Type of Ownership led to some interesting findings; both in Model 1 
and 2, companies held by the state happened to have the strongest and sharpest 
relationship with firm’s performance (Model 1: β=0,255; Model 2: β=0,091), although the 
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number of companies is relatively small which may lead to less robust results, while 
companies held by non-financial institutions present the less strong relationship with 
performance Model 1: β=0,130; Model 2: β=0,039). 
For Model 3 the results were quite different, actually the majority of the variables doesn’t 
show evidence to explain the performance measures. Board size, Board independence, 
Percentage of female board members, Supervisory Board Variable Remuneration, Age of 
CEO and Board Ownership are not statistically significant, and cannot help to prove the 
hypotheses studied, besides the fact that some coefficients agree to the predicted impact in 
performance. In terms of the Employee representation and its repercussion to 
performance, it confirms the previous findings from Model 1 and 2, showing the strong 
and positive relationship between representation and firm’s performance (significant at 1% 
level). Like the Model 1, Model 3 reveals a significant and positive relation between 
shareholder concentration and contemporaneous performance, i.e., higher values for 
Tobin’s Q. These findings corroborate my hypothesis that companies with higher levels of 
concentration (in terms of the largest shareholder) will improve firm’s performance. 
Finally the Type of ownership is not significant unlike the results of the other two models. 
8. Conclusions 
The main objective of this research was to explore the impact of some corporate 
governance variables and decisions on the measures of firms’ performance. My findings 
on this research suggest this relationship direction and extent depends upon the 
performance indicator considered. More specifically, I found the variable age of the CEO 
is only significant in explaining return on equity and return on assets, whiles it suggests 
there is no relationship with market based performance indicators (Tobin’s Q). This 
relationship is not in line with previous research, going against Child (1974), which 
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suggests managerial youth is associated with corporate growth. The only governance 
variable with significance and positive impact in all three performance measures is the 
employee representation on the board of directors (although supervisory board variable 
remuneration), and its impact on Tobin’s Q was relatively larger in comparison to the 
other measures. This measure proxies the ability of non-executive employees to influence 
decision making within a firm’s board of directors and to establish alliances with 
executive directors. These results corroborate my hypothesis that the presence of directors 
appointed by employees balance corporate policies resulting in better decisions by the 
board, allowing the company to pursue shareholder value but taking into consideration 
other stakeholders. It is interesting to see that companies held by the state present better 
performance indices than the other types of companies, it is even more interesting if we 
look at the number of companies (only 32 observations along the 8 years in the sample), 
when relating to ROE and ROA. Only concerning to Tobin’s Q, companies held by 
Financial Institutions present better results than the others, accepting my hypothesis and 
going towards the tendency in Germany of Banks being salient stockholders and 
stakeholders (Weimer and Pope (1999); La Porta et al (1999)), probably because it is a 
market measure of performance, it has a greater role in the performance of companies 
shares. Shareholder concentration has been much debated with contrary opinions about its 
influence in firm’s performance, my results showed evidence of positive impact on 
performance, supporting the idea that minority investors ride less freely and there is more 
effective monitoring of managers (although it had a negative (close to zero) result relating 
to ROA, which shows the mixed opinions are also met in this study and one cannot be 
take a definitive conclusion). A surprising result was the fact that Board Size and Board 
Independence did not provide statistically significant results, failing to support hypotheses 
subject of many researches. 
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This research provides important theoretical and practical implications. First it confirms 
the importance of the companies to look out of the pursuit of shareholder value and 
stockholders interest only, and reach further to understand all stakeholders. More 
specifically, it provided evidence that employee representation in the board of the 
companies will result in better operational and market performance, which can extent to 
other stakeholders, with the rationale that giving employees a voice in corporate 
governance likely to boost firm performance, which support the system in Germany that 
mandates well defined minimum levels for it, being. Moreover, previous literature didn’t 
give much emphasis to this topic, but given this is a characteristic of the German Model 
only, this could be implemented in other countries at least in some industries where 
employees have more power, in order to produce better negotiations and provide more 
stability to companies (Ziegler (2000), provides a better explanation of these industries). 
This study also refuted some authors who argue managerial youth is better for companies’ 
performance than the experience, consistency and robustness older CEOs provide. At the 
same level it has deepened the research about the goals that define the variable 
remuneration, especially considering only the supervisory board and showing it could play 
an important role on directors’ decisions about the company. Since it is a specific 
characteristic of the Germanic governance system, it implies fewer studies about the 
subject. 
Second, I tested my hypotheses using a sample of firms comprising the HDAX listed on 
the Frankfurt stock exchange. This is a distinction from the majority of governance 
studies, based on US samples. Using this data sample allowed me to account, not only for 
the biggest quoted companies in Germany (DAX 30), covering close to 85% of the listed 
market capitalization, but also to have an extent of observations sufficiently robust to test. 
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This study has some limitations, which provide opportunity for future research. First, 
some of our variables probably don’t have a direct linear relationship with firm’s 
performance as the employee representation, in which extreme levels can lead to exertion 
of their influence to maximize their own interests, and disregard shareholder value 
maximization. The same thing could happen with variable remuneration, since directors’ 
opinions can be motivated by pre-defined goals to achieve that remuneration. Therefore 
one aspect to improve for future research is to find an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between these variables and performance measures, in order to understand the limits to 
increase performance until the reach of the optimal level. 
Second, this research don’t have enough companies to confirm the different results on 
performance by differently held companies, more specifically companies held by the state 
had interesting results and should be studied with a higher number of state held companies 
in relation to state non-held companies. 
Third, the data sample only comprises German companies; future research should 
investigate these relationships in other countries exhibiting other institutional contexts in 
order to increase the external validity of findings reported in this study. 
Fourth, all the conclusions on the study have to be relativized and put in context, taking 
into account the size and type (only listed companies) of the sample and the timeframe, 
because the conclusions we take can only be accepted to my database, in this eight years, 
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Against the  tendency that only stockholders matter, defending the 
view of maximizing the utility for all stakeholders not only the 
shareholders. 
Discussion of the separation of ownership and control. Definition of 
the principal-agent relationship: "a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf"; and agency costs: 
monitoring and bonding expenses and the residual loss. 
Identification of mechanisms to control the agency costs. Definition 
of the concept of the firm: a set of contracts among individual 
production factors. Separation of the three major functions of 
agents, the decision making, the decision control and the residual 
risk bearing.
Disagreement of the self-interested manager concept. Define 
managers as stewards, who react to intrinsic rewards instead of the 
self-interested utility maximizer and seek organizational goals.
Directors are dispensable in the company. Support of the managers' 
role on the every day decisions.
Organizational outcomes are related to the charateristics of its top 
managers, more specifically their roots and background.
Necessity of multiple shareholders in the firm. Recognition of the 
conflict between managers and shareholders.
Highlights the importante of the directors in creating links and 







Table 1. Theories Summary 
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Table 2. Governance Systems Taxonomy 
Retrieved from: Weimer, J., & Pape, J. (1999). A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate 
Governance. 
 
Characteristic/Model Anglo-Saxon Germanic Latin Japan 
Concept of the firm Instrumental Institutional Institutional Institutional 
Board System One-Tier (executive and non-
executive board) 
Two-Tier (management board 
and supervisory board) 
One-Tier  or  Two-Tier (no 
distinction between executives 
and non-executives) 
Board of directors (inside), 
representative directors, office of 
auditors (outside) 
Salient Stakeholders Shareholders Industrial Banks, employees Financial holdings, 
government,  founder families 
Financial institutions, employees 
Importance of stock market 
in the national economy
Great importance, used to raise 
capital by companies 
Small importance Small importance Great importance 
Active external market 
control
Takeover processes are common Pratically non-existant Don’t exist because is forbidden 
by regulation 
Don’t exist 
Ownership concentration Small (Widely dispersed) High (Mostly banks) High Moderate/High (Family owned)
Performance-dependent 
executive compensation
This compensation system is very 
usual 
Is not common but is increasing Is not usual There is no necessity 
Time horizon of economic 
relationships
Short-term relationships because 
of the unrestricted market 
Long-term and stable economic 
relationships 
Long-term and stable economic 
relationships 
Long-term and stable economic 
relationships 
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General Commercial Code 
for all of Germany
Companies should be constituted with a single board of directors, although they had the 
option of a two-tier board system.
1884
General Commercial Code 
for all of Germany
Compliance with a two-tier board system.
The members of the supervisory board were not allowed to serve on the management 
board.
Shareholders could still directly elect management board members
1951
First appearence of employees' representatives in the Supervisory Board in some 
industries.
1994 Prohibition of insider trading.
1995 Establishment of the Federal Securities Supervisory Office.
Mandatory disclosure of voting rights percentages of major shareholders.
1998
First law in Germany 
regarding Corporate 
Governance
Extension of the roles of supervisory board, executive board and auditors.
Mandatory publishing of the risk structure of a company in the annual report  
Mandatory usage of IAS or US GAAP.
1998
Law for Reinforcement of 
Control and Transparency 
(KonTraG)
Enhance control of the Supervisory Board over the Management Board.




Presentation of the first proposition of a 'Code of Best.
Practice' to the German Government, undertooked by a panel of ten experts 
representing listed companies, auditors,




First Corporate Governance Code in Germany.





Capital market oriented companies need at least one independant supervisory or 
examination board member with knowledge.
Companies with more than 500 or 2000 employes need to have at least 1/3 or 1/2 of the 
members as their representatives on the Supervisory Board.
Supervisory board decides Executive board members.
Recommendation of more attention to diversity in board, hence more women.
Recommendation to have a limitation of variable salary part of a board manager should 
have an upper limit.
Every stocklisted company– need to have a yearly compliance statement.
Recommendation to present the Structure of remuneration of supervisory board is 





New Code every year with small adjustments. There has not been great changes since 
then.
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Adidas GR RWE AG St
Kontron AG Salzgitter AG
MorphoSys AG SAP AG
Continental Siemens AG
Bechtle AG ThyssenKrupp AG
Drägerwerk AG & Co. KGaA Vz TUI AG
Jenoptik AG Volkswagen AG Vz
Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology AG AIXTRON SE
QIAGEN N.V. SolarWorld AG
QSC AG United Internet AG
Software AG Aurubis AG
BASF SE Bilfinger SE
BAYER AG Celesio AG
Beiersdorf Aktiengesellschaft Deutsche EuroShop AG
BMW AG EADS N.V.
DAIMLER AG Fraport AG
Deutsche Lufthansa AG GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft
Deutsche Post AG HOCHTIEF AG
Deutsche Telekom AG Hugo Boss AG
E.ON SE Krones AG
Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA St Leoni AG
HeidelbergCement AG ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA Vz PUMA SE
Infineon Technologies AG Rheinmetall AG
K+S Aktiengesellschaft RHÖN-KLINIKUM AG
LANXESS AG SGL CARBON SE
Linde AG Sky Deutschland AG
MAN SE St STADA Arzneimittel AG
Merck KGaA Südzucker AG
METRO AG St Vossloh AG
Company
WINCOR NIXDORF Aktiengesellschaft
Table 4. Companies used in database 
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 ROE Board Size (a) Board Ownership (%) Gender of CEO (Dummy Variable)  Market Capitalization 
 ROA Non-Executive Directors (%) (b) Director Ownership (€) Age of CEO  Traded Volume (per year) 
 Sales Growth Board Independence (%)
(a) Shareholder Concentration (Largest Shareolder % 
held)
CEO Tenure (Number of years being CEO)  Net Assets 
 EBITDA/Turnover Female Board Members (Dummy Variable)
(b) Shareholder Concentration (Largest Shareolder with 
more than 5%)
Payout Ratio  Firm Size 
 Operating Margin Female Board Members (%)
(c) Shareholder Concentration (Largest 5 Shareolders % 
held)
Dividends per share  Book D/E 
 Tobin´s Q 
Employee Representation (% of 
Representatives on the board)
(a) Shareholder Concentration^2 Audit Committee Existence (Dummy Variable)  Net Sales  
 Price to Book Ratio CEO  Cash Compensation (€) (b) Shareholder Concentration^2 Remuneration Committee Existence (Dummy Variable)  EBITDA 
 Stock return Executive  Board Fixed Remuneration (€) (c) Shareholder Concentration^2 Nominations Committee Existence (Dummy Variable)  Industry Business 
 PER = Market Value per share/ 
Earnings per share 
Executive  Board Variable Remuneration  (€) Type of Controling Shareholder Supervisory Board Meetings Frequency  % of Free Float 
Supervisory Board Fixed Remuneration (€) CEO/Chairman Dual Role (Dummy Variable) Audit Committee Meetings Frequency  Auditted by a Big 4 Auditor 
Supervisory Board Variable Remuneration 
(€)
Executive Stock Compensation (Dummy Variable
Explanatory
Table 5. All Variables in database 
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* These are dummy variables. The variable is the type of shareholder that owns the 
company (ie the largest shareholder) 
Variable Name Formula 
ROE Return on Equity (ROE) =  Net Income (t) / Book Value of 
Equity (t -1) 
ROA Return on Assets (ROA) = (Operating Income after 
Depreciation)/(Year-End Total Assets)
Tobin's Q Tobin' s Q = (Market value of assets)/(Book value of 
assets)=  (Book value of assets+Market value of common 
equity-Book value of common equity- Deferred taxes 
)/(Book value of assets)
Board Size Total number of Executive and Supervisory board 
members
Board Independence Board Independence=(Number of independent 
directors)/(Total number of board members)
Employee RepresentationBoard Employee Representation =  Number of directors 
representing non-executive employees divided by the 
number of directors sitting on firm’s board at year t
Percentage of Female 
Board Members
Percentage of Female Board Members = Number of 
Female Board Members / Total Board Members
Supervisory Board 
Variable Remuneration
Total Variable Remuneration of supervisory board 
members 
Age of CEO Age of the Chief Executive Officer
Board Ownership Board Ownership = Capital owned by Board Members / 
Total stock of the firm
Shareholder 
Concentration
Shareholder Concentration = Stock held by the largest 
shareholder / Total stock of firm
Net Assets Total Assets - Total Liabilities
Firm Size Total assets at the end of the current financial year.
Largest 1* Widely held (Companies in which the largest shareholder 
hold less than 10% of the total stock)
Largest 2 * Family
Largest 3 * State
Largest 4 * Non Financial Institution
Largest 5 * Financial Institution
Largest 6 * Cross-holding
Table 6. Final Variables 
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Note: The supporting literature appoint to a relationship between the explanatory 
variable and the performance measure, not necessarily with the same expected effect as 









Literature in favour Literature against 
Board Size 
- 
Jensen (1993); Anderson et al (2004) 
Cole et al (2007); Adams & 
Mehran (2005) 
Board Independence - 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Bhagat & Black 
(2002); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); De Jong et al. 
(2005) 
Jensen and Fama (1983); Renneboog 
(2000) 
Percentage of Women on the 
Board of Directors 
+ 
Carter, Simkins, & Simpson (2003); Borisova & 
Sterkhova (2012)  
Employee Representation on 
the Board of Directors 
+ 
Shareholder Concentration + La Porta et al (2000) Demsetz & Lehn (1985) 
Type of Ownership (Financial 
Institutions) 
+ 
Silanes et al (1999); La Porta et al (2000); Weimer & 
Pape (1999) 
Age of CEO + (Child, 1974); Hart & Mellons, 1970 Hambrick & Mason (1984);  
Ownership Concentration + Berle and Means (1932); La Porta et al (2000) Loderer and Martin (1997) 
Supervisory Board Variable 
Remuneration 
+ 
AFEP/MEDEF corporate governance code of good 
practices  Pfeffer (1980) 
Guedri & Hollandts (2008) (The author finds na inverted U-shaped relation) 
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Test: Hausman test 
  Objective: Test if the unique errors (ui) are correlated with the regressors 
  Null Hypotheses: Difference in coefficients not systematic 
  




ROE   ROA   Tobin's Q 
Results: 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 2.72   chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 14.30   chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 26.33 
Prob>chi2 = 0.9939   Prob>chi2 = 0.2168   Prob>chi2 = 0.0097 
Conclusion: One should use RE   One should use RE   One should use FE 
 







JOÃO FERNANDES                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE IMPACT ON GERMAN                                                         





Test: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
Estimated Results: 
     









Null Hypotheses: Variances across entities being zero  
 
ROE 0,01082 0,10400 
 
ROE 0,01082 0,10400 
    
e 0,00590 0,07681 
 




u 0,00325 0,05704 
 
u 0,00325 0,05704 
 
ROE ROA 
        
Results: 
chibar2(01) =     4.04 chibar2(01) =   142.39 
      Prob > chibar2 =   0.0222 Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
       Conclusion: One shoud use Random Effects One shoud use Random Effects 








Test: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
  Objective: Test if the Conditional variance of Yt given Xt is not constant 
  Null Hypotheses: Constant variance 
  










chi2(1)      =    17.43 chi2(1)      =    13.85 chi2(1)      =    22.69 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0001 
 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0002 
 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Conclusion: The model has Heteroskedasticity 
 
The model has Heteroskedasticity 
 
The model has Heteroskedasticity 
Table 9. Breusch-Pagan Test for Random effects 
Table 10. Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity 
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Test: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
Objective: Test if there is correlation between values of the process at different times (First order correlation) 
Null Hypotheses: No first-order autocorrelation 
      










F(  1,      25) =     10.417 F(  1,      25) =     7.972 F(  1,      23) =     35.870 
Prob > F =      0.0035 
 
Prob > F =      0.0092 
 
Prob > F =      0.0000 
Conclusion: The data has first order correlation 
 
The data has first order correlation 
 
The data has first order correlation 







Table 10. Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for heteroskedasticity 
JOÃO FERNANDES                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE IMPACT ON GERMAN                                                         










Variable Mean Median Min Max
ROE 0,14 0,14 -0,19 0,47
ROA 0,08 0,07 -0,10 0,23
Tobin's Q 1,32 1,26 0,52 2,63
Board Size 18,3 18 5 31,00
Board Independence 0,55 0,6 0,14 0,91
Employee Representation 0,49 0,5 0,29 0,6
Percentage of Female Board 
Members
0,07 0,06 0 0,36
Supervisory Board Variable 
Remuneration
536.977          139.100          0
8.125.886        
Age of CEO 53,47 54 32 71
Board Ownership 0,09 0,01 0 0,75
Shareholder Concentration
0,24 0,17 0 0,97
Net Assets* 7003,10 2199,50 42,00 81825,00
Firm Size 9,80 9,78 7,90 11,49
Largest 1 - Widely Held **
Largest 2 - Family **
Largest 3 - State **
Largest 4 - Non-Financial 
Institution **
Largest 5 - Financial Instituion **
Largest 6 - Cross-holding **
*Values in KEUR
8
** These are dummy variables. The variable is the type of shareholder that owns the company 
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Table 13. Selection of Stata commands and options that produce robust standard 
error estimates for linear panel models. 
Retrieved from: Hoeche, D. (2007). Robust standard errors for panel regressions with 




JOÃO FERNANDES                        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE IMPACT ON GERMAN                                                         





Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
Board Size 0,000 0,003 0,89 0,000 0,001 0,96 -0,022 0,010 0,04
Board Independence -0,069 0,038 0,07 -0,013 0,018 0,48 -0,282 0,142 0,05
Employee Representation 0,106 0,048 0,03 0,010 0,024 0,67 -0,043 0,180 0,81
Percentage of Female Board Members -0,021 0,021 0,32 -0,003 0,010 0,76 -0,086 0,075 0,26
Supervisory Board Variable 
Remuneration 0,000 0,000 0,00 0,000 0,000 0,00 0,000 0,000 0,04
Age of CEO 0,004 0,001 0,00 0,002 0,000 0,00 0,005 0,004 0,17
Board Ownership -0,118 0,056 0,04 -0,039 0,026 0,13 -0,178 0,238 0,46
Shareholder Concentration 0,150 0,043 0,00 0,092 0,020 0,00 0,439 0,144 0,00
Net Assets 0,000 0,000 0,08 0,000 0,000 0,06 0,000 0,000 0,45
Firm Size -0,073 0,019 0,00 -0,038 0,010 0,00 -0,152 0,078 0,05
Largest 1 - Widely Held -0,037 0,034 0,28 0,120 0,023 0,00 0,465 0,171 0,01
Largest 2 - Family -0,072 0,037 0,05 0,090 0,024 0,00 0,247 0,183 0,18
Largest 3 - State 0,000 (omitted) 0,104 0,028 0,00 0,514 0,204 0,01
Largest 4 - Non-Financial Institution -0,111 0,036 0,00 0,100 0,024 0,00 0,329 0,178 0,07
Largest 5 - Financial Instituion -0,028 0,039 0,48 0,119 0,025 0,00 0,655 0,182 0,00
Largest 6 - Cross-holding -0,244 0,058 0,00 0,000 (omitted) 0,000 (omitted)
_cons 0,640 0,154 0,00 0,225 0,076 0,00 2,634 0,605 0,00
ROE ROA Tobin's Q
Number of obs = 190 188 179
F( 15,   174) = 6,61 7,19 9,33
Prob > F = 0,000 0,000 0,000
R-squared = 0,363 0,385 0,4618
Adj R-squared = 0,308 0,332 0,4123
Root MSE = 0,087 0,041 0,30257
OLS Regression
ROE ROA Tobin's Q
Table 14. OLS Regressions 
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Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>t
Board Size -0,001 0,003 0,72 0,000 0,001 0,71 0,001 0,010 0,91
Board Independence -0,086 0,064 0,18 -0,031 0,034 0,36 -0,983 0,464 0,04
Employee Representation 0,101 0,076 0,19 0,055 0,039 0,16 1,064 0,456 0,02
Percentage of Female Board 
Members -0,046 0,028 0,10 -0,022 0,011 0,05 -0,164 0,096 0,09
Supervisory Board Variable 
Remuneration 0,000 0,000 0,00 0,000 0,000 0,00 0,000 0,000 0,01
Age of CEO 0,004 0,001 0,00 0,002 0,001 0,00 0,008 0,006 0,20
Board Ownership -0,200 0,090 0,03 -0,098 0,048 0,04 -0,365 0,758 0,63
Shareholder Concentration 0,117 0,060 0,05 -0,002 0,024 0,94 0,660 0,208 0,00
Net Assets 0,000 0,000 0,11 0,000 0,000 0,66 0,000 0,000 0,07
Firm Size -0,079 0,025 0,00 -0,056 0,012 0,00 -0,446 0,128 0,00
Largest 1 - Widely Held 0,187 0,078 0,02 0,062 0,047 0,19 0,136 0,083 0,11
Largest 2 - Family 0,220 0,082 0,01 0,082 0,048 0,09 0,110 0,129 0,40
Largest 3 - State 0,255 0,092 0,01 0,091 0,055 0,10 0,000 (omitted)
Largest 4 - Non-Financial Institution 0,130 0,079 0,10 0,039 0,047 0,41 0,000 (omitted)
Largest 5 - Financial Instituion 0,217 0,081 0,01 0,061 0,048 0,20 0,172 0,106 0,11
Largest 6 - Cross-holding 0,000 (omitted) 0,000 (omitted) 0,000 (omitted)

















Table 15. Fixed & Random Effects 
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Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
Board Size -0,001 0,004 0,78 0,000 0,001 0,75 0,001 0,013 0,93
Board Independence -0,086 0,061 0,16 -0,031 0,042 0,46 -0,983 0,670 0,15
Employee Representation 0,101 0,068 0,03** 0,055 0,031 0,042** 1,064 0,300 0,001***
Percentage of Female Board 
Members -0,046 0,028 0,10 -0,022 0,015 0,14 -0,164 0,094 0,09
Supervisory Board Variable 
Remuneration 0,000 0,000 0*** 0,000 0,000 0,01*** 0,000 0,000 0,035**
Age of CEO 0,004 0,002 0,005*** 0,002 0,001 0,021** 0,008 0,006 0,19
Board Ownership -0,200 0,110 0,069* -0,098 0,059 0,096* -0,365 0,512 0,48
Shareholder Concentration 0,117 0,065 0,072* -0,002 0,020 0,93 0,660 0,240 0,013**
Net Assets 0,000 0,000 0,14 0,000 0,000 0,79 0,000 0,000 0,13
Firm Size -0,079 0,036 0,03 -0,056 0,015 0,00 -0,446 0,132 0,00
Largest 1 - Widely Held 0,187 0,046 0,00*** 0,062 0,030 0,041** 0,136 0,089 0,14
Largest 2 - Family 0,220 0,055 0,00*** 0,082 0,029 0,004*** 0,110 0,179 0,55
Largest 3 - State 0,255 0,067 0,00*** 0,091 0,033 0,006*** 0,000 (omitted)
Largest 4 - Non-Financial Institution 0,130 0,057 0,022** 0,039 0,029 0,18 0,000 (omitted)
Largest 5 - Financial Instituion 0,217 0,050 0,00*** 0,061 0,030 0,044** 0,172 0,140 0,23
Largest 6 - Cross-holding 0,000 (omitted) 0,000 (omitted) 0,000 (omitted)
_cons 0,492 0,260 0,06 0,477 0,139 0,00 5,349 1,338 0,00
R-sq: ROE ROA Tobin's Q
within = 0,5963 0,5792 0,6102
between = 0,6326 0,5307 0,5895




Table 16. Fixed & Random Effects with Clustered data 
***, **, *, are significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
